

**REMARKS/ARGUMENTS**

Claims 1-63 are pending in the present application. In the Office Action mailed March 11, 2005, the Examiner rejected claims 1-63 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

In the above amendments, claims 1, 22, and 43 have been amended to recite that "if the information is formatted according to an object identifier format that the at least one application is not compatible with, formatting the information so that the at least one application can process the information." Support for this amendment may be found in paragraphs 43, 50, 57, and 110 of Applicants' specification.

Claims 20, 41, and 62 have been amended to recite "determining that the application is not configured to receive the information through the first communication interface" and "determining that the application is configured to receive the information through a second communication interface." Support for these amendments may be found in paragraphs 9, 36-38, 57, and 98-99 of Applicants' specification.

Claims 21, 42, and 63 have been amended to recite "the object identifier data resulting from the single reading of a single object identifier." Support for this amendment may be found in paragraph 11 of Applicants' specification.

Reconsideration is respectfully requested in view of the above amendments to the claims and the following remarks.

**A. Rejection of Claims 1, 8-13, 18, 20-22, 29-34, 39, 41-43, 50-55, 60, and 62-63 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)**

The Examiner rejected claims 1, 8-13, 18, 20-22, 29-34, 39, 41-43, 50-55, 60, and 62-63 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on U.S. Patent No. 6,032,195 to Reber et al. (hereinafter, "Reber") in view of U.S. Patent No. 4,319,336 to Anderson et al. (hereinafter, "Anderson"). This rejection is respectfully traversed.

The M.P.E.P. states that

To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the

references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure.

The initial burden is on the examiner to provide some suggestion of the desirability of doing what the inventor has done. To support the conclusion that the claimed invention is directed to obvious subject matter, either the references must expressly or impliedly suggest the claimed invention or the examiner must present a convincing line of reasoning as to why the artisan would have found the claimed invention to have been obvious in light of the teachings of the references.

M.P.E.P. § 2142.

Applicants respectfully submit that the claims at issue are patentably distinct from the cited references. The cited references do not teach or suggest all of the limitations in these claims.

Claims 1, 22, and 43 recite, in pertinent part:

- receiving object identifier data from an object identifier reader...;
- identifying the information in the object identifier data;
- identifying at least one application to receive the information;
- if the information is formatted according to an object identifier format that the at least one application is not compatible with, formatting the information so that the at least one application can process the information; and
- sending the information to the at least one application.

In the Office Action, the Examiner asserts that "Reber teaches a method, system, and computer readable medium that ... identifies the information in the object identifier data (the data communication circuit 44, in communication with the optical code 14, directs the optical interface 32 to communicate a message based upon the decoded data stored in the memory 36)...." Office Action, page 3. Thus, the Examiner's position appears to be that the data decoded from the optical code 14 in Reber corresponds to the "information" recited in claims 1, 22, and 43.

The Examiner also states that "Reber teaches a method, system, and computer readable medium that ... identifies at least one application to receive the information, and sends information to at least one application (the processor 34 provides a personal agent enabler 46 to direct an external device, such as network apparatus 50, to retrieve and execute a destination specific software agent)...." Id. Applicants are unclear about the Examiner's position with respect to what component in Reber corresponds to the "at least one application" in the claims at issue. Presumably, the Examiner is asserting that the software agent in Reber is the "at least one application" that is recited in the claims at issue. (If this is incorrect, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner specifically point out which component in Reber corresponds to the "at least one application" recited in the claims at issue.)

Even accepting the Examiner's interpretation of Reber, Applicants respectfully submit that Reber does not teach or suggest all of the limitations in claims 1, 22, and 43. In particular, Reber does not address the situation where "the information is formatted according to an object identifier format that the at least one application is not compatible with," as recited in the claims at issue. Reber states that "the decoder circuit 42 decodes the data in accordance with a bar code format." Reber, col. 3, lines 53-54. However, the discussion in Reber simply does not contemplate that the decoded data may be in a format that the software agent cannot process. Therefore, Reber does not include any teaching or suggestion related to how this problem may be solved. In particular, Reber does not teach or suggest "formatting the information so that the at least one application can process the information," as recited in claims 1, 22, and 43.

Anderson does not make up for the deficiencies of Reber. In the Office Action, the Examiner asserts that "Anderson teaches that formatting characters are used for data that is transmitted and that the information is formatted according to a plurality of data formats." Office Action, page 5. However, the format characters disclosed in Anderson are used for a completely different purpose than the "formatting characters" recited in the claims at issue. In particular, the format characters disclosed in Anderson "indicate the physical location of the displayable characters" within segments of messages that are stored at a terminal. Anderson, col. 5, lines 2-8. The format characters

disclosed in Anderson have nothing to do with an "object identifier format," as recited in the claims at issue. In fact, Anderson is completely unrelated to object identifiers and the processing of object identifier data generally.

In view of the foregoing, Applicants respectfully submit that independent claims 1, 22, and 43 are patentably distinct from the cited references. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 1, 22, and 43 be withdrawn.

Claims 8-13 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 1. Claims 29-34 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 22. Claims 50-55 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 43. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 8-13, 29-34, and 50-55 be withdrawn for at least the same reasons as those presented above in connection with claims 1, 22, and 43.

Claims 18, 39, and 60 each recite "receiving object identifier data ... comprising information formatted according to a first object identifier format" and "formatting the information according to a second object identifier format." As discussed above, neither Reber nor Anderson, alone or in combination, teach or suggest these limitations. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 18, 39, and 60 be withdrawn.

With respect to claims 20, 41, and 62, the Examiner asserts that "two interfaces are used as recited in claims 20, 41, and 62 of the instant application (optical interface 32 and data enabler 46)." Office Action, page 6. Although Reber may teach the use of two interfaces, claims 20, 41, and 62 do not merely recite the use of two interfaces.

Claims 20, 41, and 62 relate to "interfacing an object identifier reader to an application." The object identifier reader is configured to send data to a computing device through a particular communication interface, and the application is configured to receive data through a different communication interface. The claims at issue are directed to a method for facilitating communication between the object identifier reader and the application. More specifically, claims 20, 41, and 62 each recite, in pertinent part:

receiving object identifier data from the object identifier reader through a first

communication interface...;  
identifying the information in the object identifier data;  
identifying an application to receive the information...;  
determining that the application is not configured to receive the information through the first communication interface;  
determining that the application is configured to receive the information through a second communication interface; and  
sending the information to the application on the computing device through the second communication interface.

An example of the problem addressed by claims 20, 41, and 62 is a serial port object identifier reader attempting to send data to an application that was written for a keyboard wedge object identifier reader.

Applicants also point out that the steps that are recited in these claims are performed by a "computing device." (Claim 20 is directed to a method "[i]n a computing device"; claim 41 specifies that the method is performed by "a software module stored in the memory" of "a computing device"; claim 62 is directed to a "computer-readable medium for storing ... executable instructions for implementing a method in a computing device.") Thus, the relevant question is whether Reber teaches that the network access apparatus 50 performs the steps that are recited in the claims at issue.

Reber does not teach that the network access apparatus 50 "determin[es] that the application is not configured to receive the information through the first communication interface," as recited in claims 20, 41, and 62. The two components mentioned by the Examiner – the optical interface 32 and the personal agent enabler 46 (referred to as a "data enabler" by the Examiner) – work together to facilitate execution of the software agent. See Reber, col. 4, lines 9-12 ("The personal agent enabler 46 directs the optical interface 32 to transmit a message to direct the retrieval and execution of the software agent."). However, Applicants cannot find any teaching that an application on the network access apparatus 50 "is not configured to receive" data through either the optical interface 32 or the personal agent enabler 46. Reber simply does not address the problem that claims 20, 41, and 62 relate to.

In view of the foregoing, Applicants respectfully submit that Reber does not teach or suggest all of the limitations in claims 20, 41, and 62. Moreover, Applicants cannot find (and the Examiner did not point out) any portion of Anderson which makes up for the deficiencies of Reber. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 20, 41, and 62 be withdrawn.

Claims 21, 42, and 63 recite, in pertinent part:

receiving object identifier data from the object identifier reader, ... the object identifier data resulting from the single reading of a single object identifier;  
identifying the information in the object identifier data...; and  
sending the information to the plurality of applications

The Examiner asserts that "Reber teaches that the identifier information can be sent to a plurality of applications as recited in claims 21, 42, and 63 of the instant application (see Figures 1-2, col 2 line 5 to col 7 line 58)." Office Action, page 6. Applicants are unclear about the Examiner's position with respect to what components in Reber correspond to the "plurality of applications" in the claims at issue. Presumably, the Examiner is asserting that the software agent in Reber is the "plurality of applications" that are recited in the claims at issue. (If this is incorrect, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner specifically point out which component in Reber corresponds to the "plurality of applications" recited in the claims at issue.)

Reber does not teach sending information "resulting from the single reading of a single object identifier" to a "plurality of applications." Reber consistently refers to a single software agent being activated:

Embodiments... provide methods and systems for ... automatically performing a task at the destination using a software agent.

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The processor 34 further provides a personal agent enabler 46 to direct an external device, such as a network access apparatus 50, to retrieve and execute a destination-specific software agent. The software agent facilitates the completion of a task associated with the destination 20. The personal agent enabler 46 directs the optical interface 32 to transmit a message to

direct the retrieval and execution of the software agent.

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In response to receiving a message, the network access apparatus 50 performs steps to retrieve a software agent specific to the destination 20. The software agent is retrieved either locally from a database 60 or remotely from a database 62.

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[A] step of transmitting a message based upon the decoded data is performed. The message provides a first indication of the optical code 14 and a second indication enabling a software agent to perform a task.

Reber, col. 1, line 65 - col. 2, line 1; col. 4, lines 5-12; col. 4, lines 60-62; col. 6, lines 64-67 (emphasis added).

In view of the foregoing, Applicants respectfully submit that Reber does not teach or suggest all of the limitations in claims 21, 42, and 63. Moreover, Applicants cannot find (and the Examiner did not point out) any portion of Anderson which makes up for the deficiencies of Reber. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 21, 42, and 63 be withdrawn.

B. Rejection of Claims 2-7, 14-17, 19, 23-28, 35-38, 40, 44-49, 56-59 and 61 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)

The Examiner rejected claims 2-7, 14-17, 19, 23-28, 35-38, 40, 44-49, 56-59 and 61 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Reber in view of Anderson and in further view of U.S. Publication No. 2003/0088643 to Shupps et al. (hereinafter, "Shupps"). This rejection is respectfully traversed.

The standard for establishing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is provided above. Applicants respectfully submit that the claims at issue are patentably distinct from the cited references. The cited references do not teach or suggest all of the limitations in these claims.

Claims 2-7 and 14-17 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 1. Claims 23-28 and 35-38 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 22. Claims 44-49 and 56-59 depend either directly or indirectly from claim 43. As discussed above, neither Reber nor Anderson, alone or in

combination, teaches or suggests the limitation that "if the information is formatted according to an object identifier format that the at least one application is not compatible with, formatting the information so that the at least one application can process the information," as recited in claims 1, 22, and 43. The Examiner has not asserted that Shupps teaches or suggests this limitation, and Applicants cannot find any portion of Shupps that teaches or suggests this limitation. Therefore, even if the teachings of Reber, Anderson, and Shupps were combined in the manner proposed by the Examiner, the resulting combination still would not teach or suggest all of the limitations in claims 1, 22, and 43. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 2-7, 14-17, 23-28, 35-38 44-49, and 56-59 be withdrawn.

Claim 19 depends from claim 18. Claim 40 depends from claim 39. Claim 61 depends from claim 60. As discussed above, neither Reber nor Anderson, alone or in combination, teaches or suggests "receiving object identifier data ... comprising information formatted according to a first object identifier format" and "formatting the information according to a second object identifier format," as recited in claims 18, 39, and 60. The Examiner has not asserted that Shupps teaches or suggests these limitations, and Applicants cannot find any portion of Shupps that teaches or suggests these limitations. Therefore, even if the teachings of Reber, Anderson, and Shupps were combined in the manner proposed by the Examiner, the resulting combination still would not teach or suggest all of the limitations in claims 18, 39, and 60. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of claims 19, 40, and 61 be withdrawn.




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C. Conclusion

Applicants respectfully assert that all pending claims are patentably distinct from the cited references, and request that a timely Notice of Allowance be issued in this case. If there are any remaining issues preventing allowance of the pending claims that may be clarified by telephone, the Examiner is requested to call the undersigned.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Wesley L. Austin', is written over a horizontal line.

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